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The paper shows that in a general equilibrium model with two countries, characterized
by di￿erent levels of ￿nancial development, and two technologies, one more productive and
more ￿nancially demanding than the other, the following stylized facts can be replicated:
1) the persistent US current account de￿cits since the beginning of the 90’s; 2) growth of
output per worker in developing countries in relative terms with the US during the same
period; 3) relative capital accumulation and 4) TFP growth in these countries, also relative
to the US. The more productive technology takes more time to implement and is subject to
liquidity shocks, while the less productive one, along with external bond assets, can be used
as a hoard to ￿nance those liquidity shocks. As a result, after ￿nancial globalization, if the
emerging economy is capital scarce and if its ￿nancial market is su￿ciently incomplete, it
experiences an increase in net foreign assets that coincides with a fall in the less productive
investment and a rise in the more productive one. Convergence towards the steady state
implies then both a better allocation of capital that generates endogenous aggregate TFP
gains and a rise in aggregate investment that translates into higher growth.
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change.
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11 Introduction
This paper tries to explain four stylized facts. The ￿rst one has fueled heated debates among
economists: 1) the US have run a persistent current account de￿cit since the beginning of the
1990’s. Figure 1 (a) shows that the aggregate de￿cit of the US, Australia and the UK (U) is no
longer compensated by surpluses in Europe and Japan (J), but rather by surpluses elsewhere,
notably in emerging countries (EM)1. I confront this fact to another one, illustrated in Figure
1 (b): 2) labor productivity increased in the EM relatively to U between the early 1990’s and the
mid-2000’s. Namely, Figure 1 (b) shows that the relative output per worker increased steadily
during the period, and in 2003 the gains reached 25% as compared to 1990. Figure 2 analyzes
the sources of the relative growth of emerging markets by presenting the relative evolution of
their capital per worker and total factor productivity (TFP)2. It appears that 3) the relative
level of capital per worker increased during the period and is 21% higher in 2003 than in 1990 .
In the meantime, 4) the relative TFP surged during the period and was 12% higher in 2003 than
in 1990. Therefore, the strong growth of emerging markets is partly due to TFP growth, and
not only to capital accumulation. TFP growth even explains two thirds of the relative growth of
EM.3
On the one hand, the ￿rst fact has drawn a lot of attention in the literature, but the sec-
ond one is at best ignored or taken as exogenous, at worst contradicted. On the other hand,
the study of productivity catch-up has given birth to a huge strand of literature, but, except
some exceptions, ignore the ￿rst fact. This paper aims at fueling this gap by providing a gen-
eral equilibrium framework to explain these two facts as the endogenous outcome of ￿nancial
integration. I focus on the interaction between U and EM since, according to Figure 1 (a), the
current account surpluses in the EM constitute most of the counterpart of the U de￿cits. When
explaining Facts 1 and 2, I will also be attentive at taking into account Facts 3 and 4, that is:
relative growth in emerging countries is originated in both capital accumulation and TFP growth.
Consider the conjunction of labor productivity growth and current account surpluses in
1I follow Caballero et al. (2008) in de￿ning the country groups.
2Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure of Caselli
(2004). In order to calculate TFP, I start from the following de￿nition of production per worker: y = Ax
, where
x is the level of capital per worker. TFP values in EM and U are then estimated as y
i/(x
i)
, i 2 fEM,Ug, where
α = 0.36.















































2Figure 1: Stylized facts - Global imbalances and relative growth in emerging countries
(a) Global imbalances
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(b) Productivity growth in emerging markets
















Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators) and Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
U: United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
J: Japan, Eurozone.
EM: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.
3Figure 2: Stylized facts - Sources of growth
(a) Capital accumulation in emerging markets
















(b) TFP growth in emerging markets
















Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
U: United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
J: Japan, Eurozone.
EM: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela.
Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure of Caselli
(2004). TFP values in EM and U are estimated as y
i/(x
i)
, i 2 fEM,Ug, where α = 0.36, y
i and x
i are
respectively output per worker and capital per worker in i.
4emerging markets (Facts 1 and 2). The main challenge of the study is to generate a model
where ￿nancial globalization triggers both a rise in the current account and in labor productiv-
ity. The key feature of the framework is the interaction between ￿nancial development, ￿nancial
globalization and technological change. The focus on technological change can be motivated as
follows. Consider the de￿nition of the current account surplus (CA):
CA = S   I
where S denotes savings and I investment. For a given amount of savings, a higher current
account surplus means less investment. Therefore, to be consistent with the facts (that is a
positive current account and growth in EM), savings should increase more than investment in
the emerging economies. Some theories4 that link savings to growth can account for the positive
comovement between S and I but, as Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) argue, it is not clear why
S should move more than I. Trade-related growth theory (Dooley et al., 2004, 2005; Rodrik,
2006, 2007) is also a potential candidate to explain the correlation between CA and I, since the
current account is the ￿nancial counterpart of the trade balance. However, these theories are
in general concerned with the structure of trade in terms of exports and imports, and not with
trade balance.
The focus of this paper is not on the correlation between CA and I itself. A di￿erent route
is taken: the idea is that it is not the quantity but the composition of investment that matters.
When there are di￿erent technologies, a positive correlation between CA and productivity does
not suppose necessarily that CA and I are positively related at the aggregate level. Rather, CA
should be related to the right type of investments, that is the most productive. This idea is
rendered by introducing two technologies, one more productive than the other but submitted to
idiosyncratic liquidity risk and credit constraints, as in Aghion et al. (2005). In this framework,
the composition of investment depends on the availability of liquid assets used for self-insurance
purposes. Since international markets are more developed ￿nancially, they provide a better access
to these assets. Therefore, ￿nancial globalization can trigger a better allocation of investment in
the developing economy by enabling domestic agents to hold more liquid assets in the industrial
economy. This translates into higher productivity and a positive current account, even with
given savings S.
For pedagogical issues and in order to convey the main intuition, the model is ￿rst developed
with a constant level of savings S. The mechanism can be summed up as follows. Under autarky,
4Namely, Modigliani’s OLG model (Modigliani, 1986) and the in￿nite horizon model with habit formation
proposed by Carroll et al. (2000).
5the liquidity risk cannot be perfectly insured in the emerging economy and the agents invest in
the less productive technology for precautionary purposes. There is an overaccumulation of the
less productive capital and the autarky interest rate is low relative to the industrial economy. As
a result, when ￿nancial globalization occurs, the emerging economy experiences an interest rate
rise. This has two e￿ects on the emerging economy: on the one hand, it triggers a substitution
between foreign assets and the less productive capital, which was in excess; on the other hand,
it lowers the cost of self-insurance and thus allows the agents to invest more in the productive
technology. In the developing country, CA increases and I decreases, but the composition of I
changes in favor of the more productive technology. If the productivity di￿erential between the
two technologies is high, the country is poor and ￿nancial development is low, then the economy
experiences a productivity surge. Therefore, production and foreign assets can rise simultane-
ously in the emerging market while maintaining the level of savings constant. As a corollary,
the industrial economy experiences a decline in its external position. This framework therefore
can ￿t the two stylized facts highlighted above (Facts 1 and 2). In particular, growth in the
emerging country is due to TFP (Fact 4). These results still hold when the savings rate is made
endogenous in a dynamic Ramsey growth model. Besides, in the calibration analysis, the relative
capital accumulation in the emerging country (Fact 3) can be replicated when it is capital-scarce
before ￿nancial integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews in more details the
related literature; Section 3 lays down a static model to convey the main intuitions while section
4 extends it to a dynamic Ramsey model; ￿nally, Section 5 considers the outcome of the Ramsey
model in terms of medium-run dynamics and uses a calibration approach to confront the results
to the four facts.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to the literature on capital composition and capital misallocation. Economists
have highlighted the importance of capital quality in explaining the di￿erences in TFP across
countries (Caselli and Wilson, 2004; Caselli, 2004). Others (Banerjee and Du￿o, 2005; Hsieh and
Klenow, 2007; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2007) have stressed the potential gains associated with a
better allocation of capital to more productive uses. In particular, some have highlighted the role
of ￿nancial development in the composition of investment and technology adoption. In Obstfeld
(1994), more productive technologies are riskier. As a consequence, the economy bene￿ts from
6￿nancial globalization through a greater access to insurance. Other notable contributions in that
￿eld are Matsuyama (2007), Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion et al. (2007). A common assump-
tion is that more productive investments are also more ￿nancially demanding. They show that
endogenous changes in investment technologies can occur along the business cycle and on the
equilibrium growth path. Here, I study the implication of this approach in terms of comovement
of growth and current account, using the framework of Aghion et al. (2005). This approach
based on capital misallocation is supported by the two last facts, illustrated in Figure 2: 3)
relative capital accumulation and 4) relative TFP growth in emerging countries. In this paper’s
approach, growth in emerging markets is due to the convergence of the level of capital per head
to its steady state, but also to the endogenous reallocation of capital to the more productive
technology, which translates into a higher aggregate TFP. In the calibration analysis, I will keep
track of these two additional facts.
This study is also related to the recent and rich debate on the "saving glut", concerned with
the ￿rst stylized fact, that is the decline in the US current account and the matching rise in
emerging countries. Some argue that the main reason is the twin de￿cits led by the rise in the
US public de￿cit (Chinn and Ito, 2005); others that the origin lies in emerging markets excess
savings. The latter point to the poor ￿nancial markets in emerging countries as the origin of
global imbalances, but this explanation has been interpreted in di￿erent manners. First, for
some, the main aspect is the incapacity of developing economies to protect themselves from
episodic ￿nancial crises. Among them, Bernanke (2005) points to the role of the credit crunch
that took place in the mid-90’s in emerging markets and aroused the will to build reserve war-
chests against future turmoils. This view has been also explored by Gruber and Kamin (2007),
Obstfeld et al. (2008) and RanciŁre and Jeanne (2006). Others, as Caballero et al. (2008), view
the ￿nancial crises as a￿ecting the ￿nancial intermediation system itself, which increases the
demand of emerging markets investors for foreign assets. Second, for others, it is the last wave
of ￿nancial liberalization that revealed the ￿aws of the ￿nancial system of emerging markets.
Mendoza et al. (2007a) and Mendoza et al. (2007b) focus on the ￿nancial integration of countries
with a high demand for assets due to thin domestic ￿nancial markets. Matsuyama (2005) and
Ju and Wei (2006, 2007) rely on a similar argument to explain the "uphill ￿ows" phenomenon.
This last approach is the closest to mine. It presupposes that ￿nancial crises episodes are
not at the core of the stylized facts. To back that view, consider again Figures 1 and 2. The
general picture remains una￿ected when excluding the countries that were primarily a￿ected
by the Asian crisis (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines). We also go further by
7excluding other countries that went through ￿nancial crises during the period (Brazil, Argentina
and Russia). The main trends are unchanged. The reason is that China, which accounts for
most of the stylized facts, did not su￿er a crisis. In support of my approach, consider also Figure
3. This graph is constructed using the data on current account liberalization from Chinn and
Ito (2007). Their index of ￿nancial openness is averaged across the U, J and EM countries (the
average is weighted by GDP) and rescaled in order to be equal to 100 in 1970. Compared to
the 1970’s, the 1980’s are more integrated ￿nancially, but the 1990’s globalization surge is way
more marked. The previous stylized facts could therefore be related to ￿nancial globalization.
My approach is also backed by the empirical results of Forbes (2008): she ￿nds that ￿nancial
development and capital controls are the main determinants of investment in US assets.
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Source: Chinn and Ito (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
Figures are the GDP-weighted average across a sample including the countries in U, J and EM whose data are
available for the whole period.
Some of the papers I review could be confronted to the above stylized facts. The common
idea is that the low degree of ￿nancial development in emerging markets introduces a wedge
between the social and private return to capital. This wedge induces domestic investors to turn
to foreign ￿nancial markets. In Mendoza et al. (2007a) and Mendoza et al. (2007b), this wedge is
due to the risk premium created by precautionary savings. In Matsuyama (2005), it comes from
8the presence of credit constraints among entrepreneurs. In Ju and Wei (2006, 2007), it comes
from informational rents. These approaches are successful in explaining the ￿rst fact. However,
they miss the second one, that is the relative TFP growth in developing countries. Others are
more successful. In Caballero et al. (2008), high growth economies can still export capital if their
level of development is su￿ciently low. In Aghion et al. (2006), foreign investment has positive
externalities on growth and is favored by domestic savings because it constitutes a collateral.
However, both studies respectively take the growth rate and the savings rate as exogenous,
whereas empirical evidence suggests that they cause one another (Attanasio et al., 2000). It is
also doubtful that growth is constant during long periods and that savings do not react to growth
perspectives. The strength of my approach is that growth, savings and investment behaviors are
determined endogenously.
3 Static model
This section focuses on the impact of ￿nancial globalization on portfolio choices for one period,
taking the whole amount invested as given. This helps grasping the main intuition before switch-
ing to the dynamic environment with endogenous savings. This analysis is applied to an economy
with two countries in which the bond market integrates.
3.1 Economic environment
There are two countries indexed by i 2 fI,Eg, I denoting the industrial country and E the
emerging one. For the moment, the countries’ index is neglected since we are interested ￿rst in
their individual behavior. Each country is populated by a continuum of identical entrepreneurs
of length one who live one period. Each entrepreneur is endowed with wealth w. He makes his
portfolio decisions at the beginning of the period and consumes the yield of his portfolio at the
end of the period. As in Aghion et al. (2005), he can invest in three di￿erent types of assets: the
bond b, the short-term investment k and the long-term investment z.
Timing : The detailed timing is the following:
 Morning: the entrepreneur invests his wealth w in b, k and z.
 Noon: the bond yields Rb, the short-term investment yields f(k), with f′ > 0 and f′′ < 0.
 Evening: the production activity in which the long-term investment z is involved is com-
promised by a transitory liquidity cost shock. With probability 1
2, the liquidity shock is
9equal to Φ > 0 and the entrepreneur has to pay Φ (bad shock). If the cost is paid, then
the long-term investment yields g(z) + Φ, with g′ > 0, g′′ < 0 and g > f. If not, then
the whole production is lost. With probability 1
2, the entrepreneur receives Φ and the
long-term investment yields g(z)   Φ (good shock).
 Night: the entrepreneur consumes the return of his portfolio: either Rb + f(k) + g(z) or
Rb + f(k), depending on the nature of the shock that occurred in the evening and on the
decision to ￿nance it.
The distribution of the liquidity cost implies that there is no aggregate risk: 1
2Φ   1
2Φ = 0.
The fact that the entrepreneur recovers the liquidity cost at the end of the period ensures that
the shock is transitory and that the liquidity shock is neutral regarding ex post pro￿ts. In other
words, Φ a￿ects the decision to invest only through the possibility to lose g(z).
z can be viewed as a long-term investment, involving more time than the short-term invest-
ment k. It is more productive than k, but it is also more risky and submitted to possible hazards.
This kind of investment can be interpreted as R&D expenses, or as the cost of adopting a new
technology which has to be adapted or a technology which involves more human capital. The
liquidity cost can be viewed as a shock threatening the completion of the investment process.
For example, the new machines have to be adapted to a new legislation or the entrepreneur that
has acquired new skills falls ill. In either case, all the investment expenditure can be lost if the
liquidity shock is not overcome.
Insurance : Since there is no aggregate risk, the liquidity shock can be perfectly hedged. But,
because of imperfect ￿nancial markets, only a fraction 1 ρ  1 can be insured. The entrepreneur
thus faces a liquidity shock ϕ = ρΦ with probability 1
2 and receives ϕ with probability 1
2. ϕ is
therefore the resulting perceived liquidity shock. It summarizes the level of ￿nancial markets
incompleteness.
Financing constraints : At noon, there are no credit markets, so the entrepreneurs who
su￿er from the liquidity cost cannot pay except if:
ϕ  f(k) + Rb
The other entrepreneurs receive ϕ so they do not face any ￿nancing constraint.
Therefore, because it is more risky, the long-term investment is more ￿nancially-demanding
and more vulnerable than the short-term one. On the contrary, f(k) and the yield from b can be
10used to secure the long-term production. (k,b) can therefore be viewed as the "liquid portfolio",
because it can be liquidated without cost in order to pay for the transitory shock.
3.2 Individual decisions
Entrepreneurs maximize their end-of-period expected consumption:
max
{k,b,z}







s.t b + k + z  w
With probability 1
2, entrepreneurs face the good shock and consume Rb+f(k)+g(z). With
probability 1
2, they face the bad shock and consume Rb+f(k)+g(z) if they can pay ϕ (f(k)+Rb 
ϕ). If they cannot (f(k) + Rb < ϕ), then they consume Rb + f(k). If ϕ is small, then the
entrepreneur would choose the ￿rst best portfolio maximizing Rb+f(k)+g(z). But if ϕ is high,
then the ￿rst best portfolio would violate the ￿nancing constraint. The entrepreneur would have
to choose whether to satisfy the constraint and get g(z) or to violate the constraint and get
g(z) only with probability 1
2. Indeed, if z is su￿ciently productive with regards to the liquid
portfolio, it can be pro￿table to choose not to satisfy the constraint, even at the expense of the
risk of losing g(z). This program is therefore not standard. To understand individual decisions, I
consider ￿rst the case in which the entrepreneurs want to overcome the bad shock. In that case,
they have to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint. The corresponding program can be written as:





b + k + z  w (λ  0) (BC)
ϕ  f(k) + Rb (γ  0) (FC)
(BC) and (FC) are respectively the budget and ￿nancing constraints and λ and γ are the
corresponding Lagrange multipliers. The ￿rst-order conditions associated with this program
yield the following results:
f′(k) = R
g′(z) = R(1 + γ)
11The marginal productivity of the short-term investment must be equal to the return of the
bond, which determines k, whether (FC) is binding or not. This comes from the fact that (FC)
does not interfere with the arbitrage between k and b. In other words, the return of the liquid
portfolio (k,b) must be maximized, either to optimize the entrepreneur’s consumption or to
satisfy the ￿nancing constraint (FC).
Either (FC) is not binding (γ = 0) and g′(z) = R, or (FC) is binding (γ > 0) and ϕ =
f(k) + Rb. In that case, g′(z) > R: the entrepreneur cannot invest as much as he would like in
the long-term investment z.
There are two possible solutions:
 If f(k∗) + Rb∗  ϕ, (FC) is not binding and the solution is the ￿rst best one, labeled
(k∗,z∗,b∗):
k∗ = f
′−1(R), z∗ = g
′−1(R), b∗ = w   k∗   z∗
 If f(k∗) + Rb∗ < ϕ, the ￿rst best allocation is not implementable so (FC) is binding. The
solution is the constrained one, labeled (¯ k, ¯ z,¯ b):
¯ k = k∗, ¯ b =
ϕ−f(k∗)
R , ¯ z = w   k∗  ¯ b
For a given R, if the entrepreneur is constrained, we have ¯ b > b∗ and ¯ z < z∗. The entrepreneur
under-invests in the more productive technology as compared to the ￿rst-best solution because
he has to hold an additional amount of bonds in order to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint.
Consider next the case where entrepreneurs anticipate that they will not be able to overcome
the bad shock, which means that ϕ > f(k) + Rb. Therefore, they anticipate that they will get
Rb+f(k)+g(z) with probability 1
2 (good shock) and Rb+f(k) with probability 1
2 (bad shock).
They solve the following programme:




s.t. w  b + k + z
The ￿rst order conditions lead to the following results:
f′(k) = R
12g′(z) = 2R
which yields the following solution:
k∗∗(R) = k∗(R), z∗∗(R) = g′−1(2R), b∗∗(R) = w   k∗   z∗∗
(k∗∗,z∗∗,b∗∗) is labeled the "risky" allocation. The production of the long term investment
is less e￿cient so the entrepreneur invests less in z than in the ￿rst best case: z∗∗(R) < z∗(R).
The following lemma shows when this risky allocation can be ruled out:
Lemma 3.1 (General case):








 2R, then the solution to Problem (1) is
the solution to Problem (2):
k(R) = k∗(R), z(R) = min(z∗(R), ¯ z(R)), b(R) = max(b∗(R),¯ b(R))
Proof: If z∗(R)  ¯ z(R), then the ￿rst best is implementable and the solution is z∗(R). If
z∗(R) > ¯ z(R), then the solution is either ¯ z(R) (the entrepreneur chooses to satisfy the ￿nancial
constraint) or z∗∗(R) (the ￿nancial constraint is violated and the entrepreneur takes into account
the fact that the long-term production is less e￿cient).
If ¯ z(R)  z∗∗(R), then, since k∗(R) = ¯ k(R) = k∗∗(R), ¯ b(R)  b∗∗(R). As a consequence,
ϕ = R¯ b(R) + f(k∗(R))  Rb∗∗(R) + f(k∗(R)): the ￿nancing constraint is satis￿ed for z∗∗(R).
Besides, g′(z∗∗(R)) > R. If z = z∗∗(R), the entrepreneur could be better-o￿ by increasing z
without violating the ￿nancing constraint. Therefore, the entrepreneur would prefer z = ¯ z(R)










Provided that ¯ z(R)  z∗∗(R), the risky allocation can be ruled out and the entrepreneurs’
program can be reduced to a standard constrained maximization problem, which corresponds to
Problem (2). If, besides, z∗(R) > ¯ z(R), which means that g′ (¯ z(R)) > R, then the constrained
allocation is chosen. Therefore, the range of w and ϕ over which the entrepreneurs choose the
5Note that if  z(R) < z
∗∗(R), the ￿nancing constraint is binding for z
∗∗(R). The entrepreneur has the choice
between investing  z(R) with a higher productivity (g(z)) or investing a higher amount z
∗∗(R) with a poorer
average technology (
1
2g(z)). This case is inconclusive: depending on the parameters and on R,  z(R) or z
∗∗(R)
could be chosen.










On the one hand, if the entrepreneur is poor (w low) and faces large liquidity shocks (ϕ
high), he might not be able to choose the ￿rst best allocation because he would not be able
to overcome the bad shock. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur is too poor and faces too
large liquidity shocks, then it could be too costly to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint and the
entrepreneur might choose the risky allocation. For intermediary levels of w and ϕ, he chooses
the constrained allocation.
3.3 Comparative statics
The approach here is to compare the investment decisions under autarky and ￿nancial global-
ization, de￿ned by cross-border trade in bonds. As in Mendoza et al. (2007a), the two countries
are supposed to be identical, except for the level of market incompleteness ϕ. The industrial
country I is ￿nancially developed while the emerging one E is not. In order to be more speci￿c,
I de￿ne the two following cases:
 Perfect ￿nancial markets (PFM): ϕ = 0. The entrepreneurs are perfectly insured against
liquidity shocks so the ￿rst-best decisions apply.
 Imperfect ￿nancial markets (IFM): the parameters of the model are such that the PFM
allocation is not implementable under autarky: f(k∗(Ra∗)) < ϕ, where Ra∗ is the autarky
interest rate that would prevail under PFM.
We assume then that the industrial country I has PFM, while the emerging country E has
IFM.
Two types of equilibria are compared:
 The autarky equilibrium, de￿ned by the zero-net demand for bonds in each country: bI =
bE = 0.
¯ Ra denotes the autarky interest rate under IFM (that is in E) and Ra∗ the autarky interest
rate under PFM (that is in I).
 The ￿nancial globalization equilibrium, de￿ned by the ability to trade bonds between
countries. It implies a world zero-net demand for bonds: bI + bE = 0.
We are interested in the way ￿nancial globalization a￿ects the net external position b, invest-
ment in both kinds of capital k and z, and production in both countries.
143.3.1 Autarky
Consider the investment decisions under perfect and imperfect ￿nancial markets when the econ-
omy is under autarky. For any variable X, Xa∗ denotes its autarky value under PFM and ¯ Xa its
autarky value under IFM. We solve ￿rst for the portfolio choices and then derive a proposition
for I and E.
Under PFM:
Under autarky, ba∗ = 0 so za∗ = w   ka∗, according to the resource constraint. The optimal
allocation satis￿es g′(w   ka∗) = f′(ka∗), which de￿nes the level of short term investment ka∗.
Then we can infer the level of long-term investment za∗ = w  ka∗ and the autarky interest rate
Ra∗ = f′(ka∗).
Under IFM:
By de￿nition of IFM, f(k∗(Ra∗)) < ϕ. This means that the ￿rst-best portfolio cannot
be implemented under autarky, so the solution is either the constrained or the risky one. Let’s
consider the constrained solution: under autarky, ¯ ba = 0 so, since the credit constraint is binding,
f(¯ ka) = ϕ, which de￿nes ¯ ka as ¯ ka = f−1(ϕ). Then we can infer ¯ Ra = f′(f−1(ϕ)) and ¯ za =
w   f−1(ϕ).
In order to rule out the risky allocation under autarky in E, we make the following assump-
tion:
Assumption 3.1 (Ruling out the risky allocation under autarky in E): g′(w   f−1(ϕE)) <
2f′(f−1(ϕE)).
Assumption 3.1 insures that ¯ z( ¯ Ra)  z∗∗( ¯ Ra) in E, which is su￿cient to rule out the risky
allocation (Lemma 3.1) for R = ¯ Ra. It requires that wealth w is not too low and that the degree
of market incompleteness ϕ is not too high. Otherwise, the ￿nancing constraint could be so
stringent that the entrepreneur would rather violate it, even if the long-term production is at
risk. Under Assumption 3.1 and IFM, the constrained solution exists in autarky.
Proposition 3.1 (General case): Autarky
Under Assumption 3.1, the constrained allocation is a solution in E under autarky while the
￿rst-best allocation is chosen in I. If the constrained allocation is indeed chosen in E, the autarky
15stock of k is higher, the stock of z is lower and the interest rate is lower in E than in I.
Proof:
By de￿nition of IFM, f(k∗(Ra∗)) < ϕE, which implies that f(k∗(Ra∗)) < f(¯ k( ¯ Ra)). This
yields k∗(Ra∗) < ¯ k( ¯ Ra) (or, alternatively, ka∗ < ¯ ka).
As a corollary, since z = w   k, z∗(Ra∗) > ¯ z( ¯ Ra) (or, alternatively, za∗ > ¯ za). Similarly,
R = f′(k), so ¯ Ra < Ra∗.
Finally, I has PFM, so the ￿rst best allocation is chosen. E has IFM, and Assumption 3.1
rules out the risky allocation in E for R = ¯ Ra, according to Lemma 3.1. Therefore, the con-
strained allocation is compatible with autarky. 
Figure 4 illustrates the mechanism. It represents the demands for bonds and for short-term
and long-term capital in a country with perfect ￿nancial markets (the industrial country) and a
country with binding ￿nancing constraints (the emerging country). These countries di￿er only
with regards to the level of ￿nancial development. The short-term investment k is decreasing
in R and it is identical in both countries since it follows the same optimality rule. The bond b
is increasing with R in both countries, but, for a given interest rate, the demand for bonds is
higher in the constrained economy because of the precautionary hoarding motive. As a corollary,
the demand for long-term investment is lower, because less resources are available. In order to
equilibrate the domestic bond market, the autarky interest rate has to be lower in the constrained
country than under PFM so that bond holdings are discouraged. The corresponding level of
short-term capital is higher in the constrained country than in the IFM one since b and k are
substitutes, while the level of long-term capital is lower.
The consequence of the binding ￿nancing constraint in the emerging country is that there is an
over-accumulation of the short-term investment k. Because of ￿nancial markets imperfections,
it has to be used as a store for liquidity to avoid compromising the production involving the
long-term investment. As a consequence, because of the resource constraint, there is an under-
accumulation of the long-term investment z.
3.3.2 Financial globalization
What is the e￿ect of the possibility to trade bonds between countries on foreign assets, investment
and production, from a comparative statics point of view? In order to answer this question,
remember that Proposition 3.1 showed that ¯ Ra < Ra∗. For the world bond market to clear,
16the world interest rate Ro will lay between the two autarky interest rates. We will thus have:
¯ Ra < Ro < Ra∗. When capital markets integrate, the industrial country experiences a drop in
its interest rate while the emerging one experiences a rise in its own rate.
Investment
Proposition 3.2 (General case): E￿ect of ￿nancial integration on investment
Under Assumption 3.1, a solution where the constrained allocation is chosen under general
equilibrium in E exists and exhibits the following features:
 When ￿nancial markets integrate, I experiences a drop in the interest rate. Besides, k and
z rise and b becomes negative.
 When ￿nancial markets integrate, E experiences a rise in the interest rate. Besides, k falls,
z rises and b becomes positive.
The formal proof is provided in the appendix.
As for the e￿ect of ￿nancial markets integration in the industrial country, the intuition is
as follows: when ￿nancial markets integrate, the industrial economy experiences a drop in the
interest rate, so the entrepreneurs take advantage of the new ￿nancing opportunities by increasing
their debt and reallocating their resources in favor of the productive investments.
For the e￿ect of ￿nancial globalization in the emerging country, the mechanisms are di￿erent.









R     
Wealth e￿ect <0 or >0
The ￿rst term of the derivative represents the substitution e￿ect and it is positive. When the
bond return R rises, there is a substitution between the bond and the short-term investment
in favor of the former. The second term represents the wealth e￿ect and depends on the sign
of the amount invested in the bond. If the entrepreneur is indebted, then a rise in R increases
debt repayments. In order to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint, a further decrease in the debt
level is therefore required (i.e. a further increase in b). The wealth e￿ect is then positive. If, on
the opposite, the entrepreneur holds positive claims, then an increase in R would stimulate his
revenues. Therefore, he does not need to raise b a lot to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint. The
wealth e￿ect is then is negative. Notice that in this particular case where ¯ b starts from zero,
17¯ b becomes positive after an increase in the interest rate, since there is no wealth e￿ect around
¯ b = 0.
Similarly, di￿erentiating the budget constraint (BC) with respect to R and replacing the












The interest rate has an impact on ¯ z through a wealth e￿ect opposite to that of ¯ b. To un-
derstand, consider again the e￿ect of a rise in R. According to what have been said above, if
the entrepreneur is indebted (¯ b < 0), then he must increase ¯ b more than he must decrease ¯ k
(∂¯ b+∂¯ k > 0) to keep the ￿nancing constraint satis￿ed, so ¯ z has to diminish (∂¯ z < 0), according
to the resource constraint. If he holds positive claims (¯ b > 0), then he can increase ¯ b less than
he decreases ¯ k (∂¯ b + ∂¯ k < 0), so ¯ z has room to increase (∂¯ z > 0). In this particular experiment
where the economy starts from autarky and experiences a rise in the interest rate when ￿nancial
markets integrate, the bond level ¯ b increases and becomes positive so the wealth e￿ect on ¯ z is
positive.
To sum up, in the emerging economy, R rises after ￿nancial globalization, because its demand
for bonds is higher than in the industrial country. Since R rises, k diminishes and b rises, but
not as much as k falls, so z can increase without violating the resource constraint. This comes
from the fact that b is substituted to the previously excessive k inside the liquid portfolio and
becomes positive. Thus, thanks to the now positive external assets, the rise in R generates a
positive wealth e￿ect that enables the entrepreneur to increase z while still satisfying the ￿nanc-
ing constraint. The overall e￿ect of a rise is then to lower the cost of hoarding, so there is room
for an increase in z. Therefore, because of the ￿nancing constraint, the external wealth b and the
long-term investment are complements in the emerging economy, whereas they are substitutes
in the industrial one, which has PFM.
In the appendix, it is also shown that Assumption 3.1, which rules out the risky alloca-
tion for R = ¯ Ra in the developing country, is also su￿cient to rule out the risky allocation for
¯ Ra < R < Ra∗. Indeed, R rises in the emerging economy as compared to autarky, so z∗∗(R)
decreases. Therefore, since ¯ z(R) increases, z∗∗(R)  ¯ z(R) is still veri￿ed. Notice also that the
de￿nition of IFM, which rules out the ￿rst best allocation under autarky, is also su￿cient to
rule out the ￿rst best solution under general equilibrium, because the ￿rst-best autarky interest
rate is the same as under the ￿rst-best general equilibrium. This implies that, when the bond
markets integrate, the equilibrium with a constrained allocation in E, though not necessarily
18unique (in some cases, E could switch to the risky allocation), is a valid one.
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Nota: This example is obtained with the following calibration: w = 0.6, α = 0.36, ϕ = 0.65 and A = 2.
The analysis of Figure 4 can now be complemented. Finally, while in the industrial country
the long-term investment z is decreasing in R (as k), in the emerging one, it is decreasing when
b is negative, but increasing when b is positive. This re￿ects the wealth e￿ect described earlier.
Any world interest rate between the two autarky rates would then imply a rise in debt and in
19both investments in I because their marginal return are higher than the world interest rate.
In E, investment in k decreases and b increases because the marginal return of the short term
investment is lower than the world interest rate. In the meantime, z increases because of the
positive wealth e￿ect. Finally, the general equilibrium is ￿xed between the two autarky interest
rates in order to satisfy bI =  bE, leading to the result described in Proposition 3.2.
As a preliminary conclusion, Facts 1 and 4 are satis￿ed. On the one hand, the industrial
country experiences a deterioration of its external position which results in a current account
account de￿cit. On the other, the aggregate TFP increases in the emerging country, since the
less productive investment diminishes while the more productive one increases. Fact 3 is not
satis￿ed in the static framework since the aggregate level of investment diminishes. This is a
consequence of the assumption that savings w are ￿xed: if the external position in E becomes
positive after ￿nancial integration, the resource constraint implies that the aggregate level of
investment k + z diminishes. Fact 2 remains to be examined.
Production In the industrial country, both investments increase thanks to the decrease in
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In the emerging country, the impact of ￿nancial markets integration on production is am-
biguous, because of the rise in the interest rate (∂R > 0) implies a diminution in the short-term
investment and a rise in the long-term investment:
∂¯ y = g′(¯ z)
∂¯ z
∂R     
>0
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>0
The overall e￿ect on production depends on whether the gains from increasing z compensate
for the losses from decreasing k. Notice that the evolution of production can be decomposed as
follows:









      
Aggregate investment e￿ect (<0)




      
Investment composition e￿ect (>0)
The impact on production of a rise in R depends both on the aggregate quantity of investment
¯ z + ¯ k, but also on the quality of investment, represented by the amount of long-term investment
¯ z. The impact of the latter depends on the productivity di￿erential between both technologies
20g′(¯ z)   f′(¯ k), which is positive since the ￿nancing constraint is binding. As for the impact on
aggregate investment, it is negative according to Proposition 3.2.
Interestingly, a certain amount of disconnection between aggregate investment and production
appears. Even though the aggregate level of investment is negatively related to the external po-
sition in E, production does not necessarily respond negatively to the increase in bond holdings.
It can even be positively related to the external position as long as the investment composi-
tion e￿ect is strong enough. Indeed, this e￿ect is proportional to the productivity di￿erential
g′(¯ z)   f′(¯ k), which measures the amount of investment misallocation. Fact 2 can therefore be
accounted for if the parameters are such that the investment composition e￿ect compensates for
the aggregate investment e￿ect.
To understand what happens to production under IFM, I use a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation:
f(k) = kα, g(z) = Azα, with 0 < α < 1 and A > 1. In order to simplify the analysis, I abstract
from general equilibrium e￿ects on the interest rate, which I consider as second-order phenom-
ena. I focus on the impact of a given rise in the interest rate.
Proposition 3.3: E￿ect of an interest rate rise on production (Cobb-Douglas case)
If the constrained allocation holds in E, if A and ϕE are high, if w is small, then a rise in
the interest rate has a positive e￿ect on production in E.
Proposition 3.3 comes from the fact that A, ϕE and w have an impact on the amount of cap-
ital misallocation g′(¯ z) f′(¯ k). When the relative productivity of the long-term investment A is
high, the long-term investment is much more productive than the short-term one, so the overall
impact is positive, even if the short-term investment diminishes. If the liquidity requirement ϕE
is high, the entrepreneur accumulates more short-term capital k under autarky because he needs
a higher amount of hoarding. As a consequence, the level of the long-term investment is small
and its marginal productivity is high relative to the short-term one. This is also the case when
the entrepreneur’s wealth w is low. Consequently, the gains in terms of output from increasing
the long-term investment are high and are more likely to overcome the losses from decreasing
the short-term one. In other words, the higher the extent of the capital misallocation, the higher
the potential gains from globalization.
21Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 show that a global economy where the emerging markets are less
developed ￿nancially can reproduce the stylized facts highlighted in the introduction, except
Fact 3. After ￿nancial markets integrate, the industrial economy hosts capital in￿ows as a
response to the increase in the foreign demand for bonds. This is Fact 1. On the opposite,
in the emerging economy, ￿nancial globalization implies capital out￿ows. This increase in the
external position enables the developing country to produce more by reallocating investment to
the more productive technology, despite the fall in aggregate investment. In other words, the
increase in production takes place through an investment composition e￿ect, which results in an
improvement in aggregate TFP and compensates for the deterioration in the total investment
level. Since the composition of investment in the industrial country remains identical, there are
relative TFP gains in the emerging country. This is Fact 4. However, it is unclear whether the
production gains are higher in the developed or in the developing country. The quantitative
section will enable us to establish Fact 2 more precisely. As for Fact 3, it is not veri￿ed since
aggregate investment diminishes in the emerging country while it increases in the industrial
country. However, this is because we assumed constant savings for pedagogical purposes and in
order to yield the main intuitions. This is an unrealistic hypothesis that we will relax in the
remainder of the paper. The next section thus extends this static model to an intertemporal
Ramsey framework to take into account endogenous saving behavior and to analyze the long-term
e￿ects of ￿nancial integration. The dynamic version will also enable us to run a quantitative
analysis.
4 The Ramsey framework
4.1 Economic environment
It is assumed that an entrepreneur lives in￿nitely and maximizes his intertemporal utility:
∑∞
s=0 βs log(ct+s) with ct his consumption in period t. Each period t, he chooses how much
to consume out of his wealth and how much to invest in each of the three assets described ear-
lier: kt+1, zt+1 and bt+1. The production processes are the same as in the one period model.
The continuum of entrepreneurs is of length one. We rely on the Cobb-Douglas example with
partial depreciation δ: f(k) = kα + (1   δ)k and g(z) = Azα + (1   δ)z, A > 1, 0 < δ < 1.
224.2 Individual decisions
4.2.1 Individual program
Let wt denote wealth in period t. The entrepreneur solves the following program:
V (wt) = max
{kt+1,zt+1,bt+1}
log(wt   bt+1   kt+1   zt+1) (4)
+β[(1
2 + 1
21{f(kt+1)+Rt+1bt+1≥ϕ})V (Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) + g(zt+1)) +
1
21{f(kt+1)+Rt+1bt+1<ϕ}V (Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1)]
In period t, wt is given and the entrepreneur chooses how much to invest in (kt+1,zt+1,bt+1).
He consumes wt   bt+1   kt+1   zt+1 in period t. In period t + 1, his wealth wt+1 is equal
to Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) + g(zt+1) if the good shock occurs (with probability 1
2) or if the bad
shock occurs and is overcome (with probability 1
2 if f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1  ϕ, 0 otherwise). It is
equal to Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) if the bad shock occurs and is not overcome (with probability 1
2 if
f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 < ϕ, 0 otherwise).
As in the previous section, the entrepreneur’s program is not standard. Consider ￿rst the
simpler program where the entrepreneur chooses to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint f(kt+1) +
Rt+1bt+1  ϕ. We will show afterwards the conditions under which this actually happens. In
that case, the entrepreneur solves a standard constrained maximization problem:
V (wt) = max
{kt+1,zt+1,bt+1}
log(wt   bt+1   kt+1   zt+1) + βV (Rt+1bt+1 + f(kt+1) + g(zt+1)) (5)
s.t. f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1  ϕ (γt+1  0)
where γt+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the ￿nancing constraint in t + 1.
The ￿rst-order conditions associated with this program are the following:

   













which yields the following results:
f′(kt+1) = Rt+1






If the entrepreneur is not constrained (γt+1 = 0), then g′(zt+1) = Rt+1. If on the opposite
he is constrained (γt+1 > 0), then f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 = ϕ. Besides, g′(zt+1) > Rt+1 and
Ct+1
Ct > βRt+1, which means that, on the one hand, there is an under-accumulation of the long-
term asset, and, on the other hand, the bond and the short-term asset are in excessive demand,
because of their hoarding function, as in the static model.
In the remainder of the analysis, only two cases will be considered: the case where the
entrepreneur is always constrained (f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1 = ϕ) and the case where the level of
long-term investment is always optimal (g′(zt+1) = Rt+1). Appropriate conditions such that
these solutions exist for the particular experiment that I will conduct will be explicited later.
4.2.2 Individual dynamic system




Ct = g(zt)   zt+1 + f(kt)   kt+1 + Rtbt   bt+1 (7)
(6) is the Euler equation. Equation (7) is derived from the budget constraint.
When the entrepreneur is unconstrained, there are four variables, Ct, bt, kt and zt. However,
kt and zt can be pinned down to Rt using f′(kt) = g′(zt) = Rt, so the number of variables is
reduced to two.
When the entrepreneur is constrained, there are four variables, Ct, bt, kt and zt. Here, only
kt can be pinned down to Rt using the fact that f′(kt) = Rt. However, we can use the fact that
bt = [ϕ f(kt)]/Rt when the ￿nancing constraint is binding, so the number of unknown variables
is reduced to two.
4.3 The experiment
We focus on the impact of ￿nancial integration on the long-term external position, the interest
rate, capital accumulation and growth. There are still two countries, I, with perfect ￿nancial
markets, and E, with imperfect ￿nancial markets. Now, for calibration purposes, I and E not
only di￿er with respect to their level of ￿nancial incompleteness ϕi, but also with regard to their
initial endowment in capital per head xi
0 = ki
0 + zi
0, and to their size, that is the length ni of
24their continuum of entrepreneurs. It is assumed that ￿nancial globalization (i.e. trade in bonds)
occurs at t = 0. When ￿nancial globalizzation occurs, that is when cross-border trade in bonds
is allowed, the world aggregate demand for bonds must be equal to zero at each date t > 0:
nIbI
t + nEbE




We denote respectively z∞ and k∞ the values of long-term and short-term capital such that
g′(z∞) = f′(k∞) = 1
β. They correspond to the ￿rst-best steady-state levels of long-term and
short-term capital. The two kinds of ￿nancial institutional environment are de￿ned as follows:
 PFM, for which ϕ = 0 so the ￿rst-best decisions apply.
 IFM, for which ϕ satis￿es f(k∞) < ϕ.6 This condition means that the constraint is neces-
sarily binding at steady state. We will show later that it is also a su￿cient condition for
the ￿rst best allocation to be ruled out for the particular experiment conducted here.
Additionally, in order to rule out the risky allocation in the emerging economy, the following
assumption is made:
Assumption 4.1 (Ruling out the risky allocation): xE
0 > ¯ kE
0 +g′−1(f′(¯ kE
0 )) where ¯ kE
0 satis-
￿es: f(¯ kE
0 ) = ϕE
Assumption 4.1 states that, for the given amount of capital xE
0 in E, and for the autarky




0 , is larger than the risky one, which is g′−1(f′(¯ kE
0 )). This insures, for arguments
similar to Lemma 3.1, that the constrained solution is a valid one at t = 0. As we will show,
Assumption 4.1 is also a su￿cient condition for the validity of binding ￿nancing constraints all
along the transition path, at least for the experiment conducted here. It requires that xE
0 is not
too small and that ϕE is not too high.
It is assumed ￿rst in what follows that the ￿nancing constraint is binding in the emerging
economy, which has IFM. It will be shown later that this assumption de￿nes a valid equilibrium
under Assumption 4.1.
The industrial economy is in steady state at t = 0: zI
0 = z∞ and kI
0 = k∞. The emerging
economy is assumed to be capital-scarce as compared to the industrial one at the date of ￿nancial
6That is, as a function of the parameters: ϕ > (α/[1/β   (1   δ)])

1  + (1   δ)(α/[1/β   (1   δ)])
1
1 
25integration. To represent this fact, I impose xE
0 < x∞ = k∞ +z∞. As we have additionally that
ϕE > f(k∞), the ￿rst-best allocation is not implementable at t = 0. According to Assumption
4.1, the risky allocation is also ruled out in E at t = 0. As a consequence, the ￿nancing constraint
is binding in E at t = 0. Therefore, the amount of short-term capital kE
0 in E is equal to ¯ kE
0
(so f(kE
0 ) = ϕE). We have then kE
0 > k∞, since ϕE > f(k∞). As a corollary, we have zE
0 < z∞,
since xE
0 < x∞. Thus, E is scarce in z, but not in k: at the date of ￿nancial integration, the
emerging market is over-endowed with short-term capital, because of its liquidity needs. As in
the static model, the demand for liquid assets is greater in E than in I. This translates into a
lower autarky interest rate in E: f′(kE
0 ) < f′(k∞).
4.4 General equilibrium dynamic system
Assume ￿rst that the ￿nancing constraints are binding in E (we will show later that this is
indeed the case). Applying Equations (6) and (7) in I and E, where the entrepreneurs are not
constrained, and in E, where they are, and using the fact that Rt = g′(zI
t ), f′(kI
t) = Rt and
nIbI
t =  nEbE








t+1) for t  0 (8)
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26Equations (8) and (9), which govern the dynamics of the developed economy, are independent
from the rest of the system, since they only involve zI and cI. Once the dynamics of zI and
cI is solved using this independent dynamic sub-system with 2 variables and 2 equations, the
dynamics of zE and cE can be inferred using Equations (10) and (11).
4.5 E￿ect of ￿nancial globalization in the long run
Here, I examine the long-run impact of ￿nancial integration at t = 0.
Proposition 4.1: E￿ect of ￿nancial markets globalization in the long run
Under Assumption 4.1, the solution where the emerging economy satis￿es the ￿nancing con-
straint at t = 0 and at steady state exists and exhibits the following features:
(i) The emerging economy experiences in the long run an increase in the more productive invest-
ment, a decrease in the less productive investment and a positive external position. On the
whole the investment level increases.
(ii) The industrial economy experiences no change in its investment levels in the long run, but
exhibits a negative external position.
Assume ￿rst that the ￿nancing constraint is satis￿ed in the emerging economy at steady
state. The dynamics is characterized by Equations (8)-(11). According to Equation (8), the
steady state in I is characterized by constant consumption and by a constant marginal return to
z equal to 1/β. Therefore, the marginal return to k converges also to 1/β, and so does the interest
rate. With trade in bonds, from the point of view of the emerging economy, the world interest
rate converges to 1
β. As a consequence, the emerging economy’s short-term capital adjusts to
1/β in the long run. As for its long-term capital, the constancy of consumption implies that it
adjusts to the inverse of the time discount factor 1/β. Therefore, with trade in bonds, the steady
state in both I and E is characterized by a constant interest rate equal to 1/β and by identical
investment levels: zI
∞ = zE
∞ = z∞ and kI
∞ = kE
∞ = k∞. How do these steady-state outcomes
compare to the initial conditions?
Consider ￿rst (i). The intuition for the emerging economy is as follows. Before ￿nancial
markets integrate, the demand for liquid assets is higher in E than in I. Under autarky, the only
available liquid asset is k. As a consequence, E holds excessive short-term capital (kE
0 > k∞).
However, when ￿nancial markets integrate, the ￿nancing constraint can be satis￿ed by holding
27external bonds, while k can adjust to the world interest rate. In the long run, k is equal to k∞,
since the steady-state interest rate is de￿ned by I’s discount factor, which is identical to E’s. Put
di￿erently, thanks to ￿nancial integration, the steady-state level of short-term capital is equal
to the ￿rst-best one, since the world interest rate is pinned down to the industrial country’s,
which does not su￿er from any ￿nancing constraint. E then experiences a decline in the less
productive investment. As for the external position of E, it is necessarily positive to satisfy
the ￿nancing constraint, since the steady-state level of short-term investment is not su￿cient
to satisfy the liquidity requirements (f(k∞) < ϕ). Besides, at t = 0, the country is scarce in
long-term investment z, which means that zE
0 < z∞ by assumption. Therefore, the emerging
market experiences a rise in the more productive investment. The rise in the investment level
comes from the assumption that E is capital-scarce in t = 0: xE
0 = x∞.
(ii) is straightforward: the industrial country experiences no changes in its capital stocks in
the long run compared to their initial levels, since they start at steady state. However, in general
equilibrium, its external position should be the counterpart of the emerging country’s. Since the
emerging country runs a positive external position, the industrial economy is necessarily indebted
in the long run.
Finally, we have to show that this solution is possible. We have shown earlier that under
Assumption 4.1, the case where E satis￿es the ￿nancing constraint at t = 0 exists. In this case,
kE
0 > k∞, which implies that the steady-state interest rate is higher than the autarky interest
rate in E at t = 0. Therefore, the risky allocation is lower at steady state than at t = 0. Since
zE
0 is lower than z∞, which is the value of the long-term investment in the long run when the
￿nancing constraint is satis￿ed, then the risky allocation is lower than the constrained one, and
it is not optimal for the entrepreneurs to switch to the risky level. Thus, the steady state solution
where E satis￿es the ￿nancing constraint does exist.
Now these results can be confronted to the stylized facts. Fact 1 to 4 are satis￿ed, as long
as we compare the starting point to the ending one. We note: 1) a deterioration of the external
position in I, 2) an increase in individual productivity in E relative to I due to: 3) a relative
increase in the aggregate level of capital per head and 4) a relative increase in TFP. This last
outcome is due to the switch from the less productive technology to the more productive one in
E, while the technological structure is unchanged in I. What is left is to determine whether the
medium-term patterns are respected qualitatively and whether the model is able to reproduce
the facts in terms of the order of magnitude. This is the object of the next section.
285 E￿ect of ￿nancial globalization in the medium run
In this section, I study the qualitative and quantitative implications of the model in the medium
run. The goal is to apply the experiment detailed in the preceding section. In other words,
I evaluate the impact of ￿nancial globalization in a world composed of two countries, one, I,
which is at its stationary equilibrium on the date of ￿nancial integration and which bene￿ts from
perfect ￿nancial markets, and the other, E, which is capital-scarce and su￿ers from poor domestic
￿nancial markets. We should be particularly attentive to the impact of ￿nancial globalization
on the external asset position, the current account, growth and its di￿erent sources: capital
accumulation or TFP growth driven by capital reallocation. The purpose here is not to match
the data exactly, but rather to reproduce the right patterns (qualitative ￿t) and check whether
the magnitude of the trends are reasonable (quantitative ￿t).
The ￿rst country (I) is representative of the U group, mainly composed of the United States,
but which includes also Australia and the United Kingdom. The second one (E) aggregates
countries in the EM group, which is composed of a signi￿cant number of emerging economies:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singa-
pore, Thailand and Venezuela. I assume that ￿nancial markets integrate in 1990 and observe the
economic behavior in I and E in order to confront them to the data for the period 1990-2003.
5.1 Calibration
α is set to 0.36, β to 0.96, δ to 10%, as is common in the literature. The ratio of workers nE/nI is
set so that the steady state share of U’s GDP (nIyI) in the world GDP (de￿ned as nIyI +nEyE),
which is also the share of U’s workers in the world population when convergence is achieved, is
equal to 60%, its value in the last observed period (2003). This gives a ratio of 1.5.
The baseline value for A is set to 2. This value is in the range of ￿rms productivities estimated
by Banerjee and Du￿o (2005) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2007). Besides, it yields a standard
error for the logarithm of TFP equal to 0.3 at steady state, which is close to the one measured
by Bartelsman et al. (2006) for the US.
The initial level of capital per head in EM in the beginning of period xE
0 is set such that the
share of EM capital in the world stock (nExE
0 /[nExE
0 + nIx∞] according to the model) is equal
to 47%, its observed value in the beginning-of-period (1990). This gives a level of capital per
head in EM xE
0 equal to 60% of the level of capital per head in U x∞. Capital stocks in EM and
U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure of Caselli (2004).
29One important parameter, EM’s initial share of long-term capital in total capital zE
0 /xE
0 ,
remains to be de￿ned. Two methods are used to set this value. The ￿rst method, which is the
baseline one, consists in ￿xing this value in order to match the observed relative change in EM’s
TFP between 1990 and 2003 (+12%). TFP is not measured as the productivity average across
technologies weighted by the investment or production shares of these technologies, but as y/xα,
which corresponds to the stylized facts of Figure 2. As we do not have real estimates for z and
k, we must use a measure based on aggregate investment, and not on its components in order to
compare the outcome of the model to the data. The resulting initial share of long-term capital
in EM zE
0 /xE
0 varies with A. When A = 2, it represents 38% of the corresponding variable
in U. For the sensitivity analysis, we also use another benchmark to set zE
0 /xE
0 : the observed
end-of-period external position in U as a share of GDP (-22%). The external position in U as a
share of GDP is simply given by bI/yI after 13 periods.
The baseline parameter set as well as the variables that were used to de￿ne them is summed
up in Table 1.
Table 1: Baseline parameter set
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0) = 12% Penn World Tables 6.2
5.2 Qualitative ￿t
Here, I determine whether the medium-term patterns of Figures 1 and 2 are recovered. The
results are showed analytically for the linear approximation of the dynamic system (8)-(11) and
illustrated using the baseline calibration.7
The dynamic system (8)-(11) is linearized around the steady state. The evolution of the
industrial economy boils down to a linear dynamic system of two equations and two unknown,
7Even if the model is solved analytically in the appendix in order to establish Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, the




t . Once the dynamics of zI is solved using this independent dynamic sub-system with 2
variables and 2 equations, the dynamics of zE can be inferred using the log-linearized version of
Equations (10) and (11). The appendix provides the results of the log-linearization in more detail.
Proposition 5.1
If the emerging country is constrained and if jϕE   f(k∞)j is su￿ciently close to zero, then,
after ￿nancial integration, the industrial country experiences ￿rst a drop and then progressive
increase in the interest rate. It experiences a sharp increase and then a declining path for z and
k. The same pattern holds for y.
The formal proof is available in the appendix.
The intuition of the dynamics is as follows. Before ￿nancial globalization, because of ￿nancial
frictions and its need for liquidity, the emerging country holds excessive amounts of short-term
capital. This is apparent in Figure 5, which represents the behavior of some key variables. In
particular, graphs (a) and (b) show that the level of short-term capital is higher in E than in
I. As a consequence, the autarky interest rate is lower, as graph (c) illustrates it. Therefore,
when ￿nancial markets integrate, the world interest rate adjusts in between. From the industrial
country’s point of view, the interest rate falls, which stimulates investment and production.
This is apparent in graphs (a) and (e). After this initial shock, the interest rate begins to rise
progressively towards its long-run value. As a corollary, the investment and production levels
decrease towards their steady-state after the initial rise.
Note that the hypothesis that jϕE   f(k∞)j is small is made to insure that the trajectory of
zI is unique.8
What does this imply for capital accumulation in the developing country?
Proposition 5.2
Under Assumption 4.1, if ∆zE
0 < 0, if jϕE  f(k∞)j and jϕE  f(k∞)j/j∆zE
0 j are su￿ciently
close to zero, then, after ￿nancial integration:
(i) The solution with permanently binding ￿nancing constraints in the emerging economy exists
and is unique.
(ii) The emerging country experiences a sharp, then progressive increase in the interest rate. It
8As in Woodford (1986), the cohabitation of two kinds of agents, one constrained and the other unconstrained,
can generate instability.
31experiences a growing path for b and z and a decreasing path for k. The path for y, after
an initial adjustment, is increasing in the early stages of transition.
(iii) The production in the emerging country is increasing relative to the industrial one along
the transition path, after an initial adjustment.
The formal proof is available in the appendix.
(i) derives from the fact that if the entrepreneurs anticipate the interest rate path consistent
with binding ￿nancing constraints, then the constraints are actually binding, since this path is
unconsistent with both the ￿rst-best and risky solutions for zE. The argument is similar to the
one for Proposition 4.1 and relies on the fact that the interest rate and the constrained zE are
increasing on the constrained path for the corresponding set of assumptions.
Consider (ii). Assume that the ￿nancing constraint is binding all along the transition path
in the emerging economy: bE
t = [ϕE   f(f′−1(Rt))]/Rt, where Rt is the world intrest rate. The
external position in E is therefore determined exactly as in the static model, and its derivative









R     
Wealth e￿ect <0 or >0
The sign of the e￿ect of the interest rate on bE depends on the relative magnitude of the
wealth and substitution e￿ects. Wealth and substitution e￿ects determine the impact of the
variation in interest rate in exactly the same fashion as in the static model: on the one hand,
if the interest rate rises, then the external bond is substituted to the short-term capital, which
makes the level of bonds increase; on the other hand, if the level of bonds is positive, then the
increase in the interest rate eases the liquidity requirements, so the level of bonds does not need
to rise a lot. If this wealth e￿ect is high, the level of bonds might even decrease. Therefore, since
the external position is small (ϕE close to f(k∞)), the substitution e￿ect dominates and the level
of bonds increases with the interest rate (∂bE/∂R). Consider now the path of the interest rate
Rt from the point of view of the emerging country: as illustrated by graph (c) of Figure 5, it
is set above the initial autarky interest rate after ￿nancial integration because the demand for
bonds is lower in I, and then continues to increase as it converges to its steady state level. As
a result, the bond level is increasing in E, as graph (b) shows. As a counterpart, the external
position of the industrial country bI
t is declining, as illustrated in graph (a). Therefore, E will
exhibit current account surpluses on the transition path while I will exhibit de￿cits, as graph
(d) indicates.
32zE follows an increasing path for two reasons: initial scarcity and wealth e￿ects similar to
the ones discussed in the static case. First, since the level of bond holdings is constrained, zE
does not adjust immediately to the world interest rate and behaves rather as under autarky.
Namely, because it is in a scarce supply, it follows an increasing path towards its steady state.
Second, the world interest rate is increasing steadily from the point of view of E, which eases the
credit constraint more and more at each period, enabling entrepreneurs in E to invest more in
the long-term capital zE. Indeed, since the bond level is positive, an increase in the interest rate
stimulates the yield of the liquid portfolio "mechanically", and the amount of resources necessary
to satisfy the ￿nancing constraint diminishes. This wealth e￿ect provides therefore additional
resources which are then dedicated to the long-term investment. This last e￿ect contributes up
to 5% of the growth in he long-term investment in E. The resulting increasing path for zE is
provided in graph (b).
On the opposite, kE, which adjusts to the world interest rate, follows a decreasing path, as
illustrated in graph (b). The result is therefore ambiguous for yE. However, it can be shown that
when jϕE  f(k∞)j is small relative to j∆zE
0 j, yE is increasing in the early stages of transition, as
illustrated in grph (e). Indeed, jϕE   f(k∞)j gives the extent of the interest rate adjustment at
the date of ￿nancial integration and the distance to steady state of the new world interest rate.
By extension, it also gives the distance of kE to its steady state. Therefore, the hypothesis that
jϕE   f(k∞)j is small relative to j∆zE
0 j implies that zE is further from its steady state than kE.
It thus converges more rapidly and production bene￿ts more from the increase of the long-term
capital than it su￿ers from the fall in short-term investment.
(iii) states that, despite the fact that yE is not always growing, it is increasing as compared
to yI. Indeed, the growth of yE is reversed for high ts only because of the decline in short-term
investment, which a￿ects yI in the same way. As a consequence, E and I di￿er only with regards
to the long-term investment, which is increasing in E and decreasing in I. Therefore, in relative
terms, yE is growing as compared to yI, as illustrated in graph (f). However, the graph shows
that this is true only at the date of ￿nancial integration, where the production in E falls relatively
to I. This comes from the sharp initial adjustment in short-term capital, also visible in graph (f).
Proposition 5.2 implies that, under the speci￿ed conditions, the equilibrium with permanently
binding ￿nancing constraints in the emerging market exists and that in this equilibrium, the
developing country exhibits current account surpluses, which are the counterpart of de￿cits in
the industrial one (Fact 1). Besides, the production per head (entrepreneur) is increasing in
33Figure 5: E￿ect of ￿nancial integration at t = 0




























































































































Nota: This simulation is obtained with the baseline parametrization summed up in Table 1.
the emerging country relative to the industrial one (Fact 2). This relative increase takes place
thanks to capital accumulation (Fact 3), but also through aggregate TFP gains due to capital
reallocation (Fact 4). Relative TFP increases smoothly in the calibration (graph (f) of Figure
5), as in the data (Figure 2), but relative aggregate capital and relative production per capita
exhibit an initial fall in the simulation, while it increases steadily in the data (Figures 1 and 2).
This can be explained by the fact that, in the emerging country, the adjustment in short-term
capital is sharp, while the adjustment in long-term capital is smooth, as graph (b) shows. This
shortcoming can be limited by adding capital installation costs.
34Overall, the qualitative implications of the model in terms of qualitative adjustment of the
variables of interest are globally satisfying, except for the initial adjustment. This issue will be
tackled later by adding capital installation costs. Another question is whether the calibration of
the model yields the adequate orders of magnitude for the stylized facts.
5.3 Quantitative ￿t
The results of the baseline method are reported in columns (a)-(c) of Table 2 for A = 2, the
baseline value for A, but also for A = 1.7 and A = 3, for robustness analysis. In column (d),
zE
0 /xE
0 is set such that the external debt is equal to 22% of GDP on average between 1990 and
2003, with A = 2. The inferred share of initial long-term capital in total capital is not shown




z∞/x∞. The following values are also reported for each calibration:
TFP growth, the growth of capital per worker, the growth of production per worker in E, all
relative to I; the share of growth in E attributable to growth in relative TFP; the end-of-period
external position as a share of GDP and average current account as a share of GDP in I. Because
of the lack of data on k and z, each calibration method uses a key stylized fact to determine zE
0 .
However, it is still possible to confront the model to the other facts. For example, when zE
0 is set
to match the observed TFP growth, I examine bI/yI and the share of growth that is due to TFP
(columns (a)-(c)); when it is set to match the US’s external position, I examine TFP growth
and the share of growth that is due to TFP (column (d)). Last, column (e) gives the observed
values of the corresponding variables. The variables that were set to their observed values in the
calibration columns are presented in bold characters.
In the baseline calibration with ￿xed growth in relative TFP (column (a) of Table 2), the
growth in relative output per worker is 1.5 times higher than in the data. This is a consequence
of the fact that the model over-estimates the amount of growth in relative capital per worker by
more than twice. As a result, the share of growth attributable to TFP is not as high as in the
data: it is one third smaller. The amounts of end-of-period external debt and average current
account de￿cit in I are over-estimated respectively by a factor of three and two. However, given
the parsimony of the model, these are not bad results: the estimates are in the right order of
magnitude. In the model, the external position and capital adjust too quickly. With appropriate
installation costs on investment, the model could ￿t the data better. In other words, the bias of
the model goes in the right direction: making it more realistic by adding adjustment costs could
make it closer to the data. We check this in the extension with capital installation costs.
35Table 2: Calibration results
Baseline Sensitivity Data
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)




z∞/x∞ 38% 34% 46% 64% Unobservable
TFP growth of E relative
to I 12% 12% 12% 4% 12%
Growth of capital per
worker in E relative to I 44% 47% 38% 52% 21%
Growth of production per
worker in E relative to I 28% 29% 26% 21% 18%
% of relative growth due
to TFP 46% 44% 49% 19% 68%
End-of-period bI/yI -61% -53% -73% -22% -22%
Average ∆bI/yI 4,8% -4,1% -5,7% -1.7% -2,6%
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and Penn World Tables
6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
I corresponds to U: United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
E corresponds to EM: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand
and Venezuela.
Period: 1990-2003.
Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure of Caselli
(2004). TFP values in EM and U are estimated as y
i/(x
i)
, i 2 fEM,Ug, where α = 0.36, y
i and x
i are
respectively output per worker and capital per worker in i.
Consider now the additional columns (b) and (c) of Table 2, which give the calibration results
for di￿erent values of A. Notice that, in columns (a)-(c), the estimated share of long-term capital
in total capital is increasing in A relatively to the steady state: the higher the productivity of
the long-term investment compared to the short-term one, the lower the amount of misallocation
needed to generate a given growth in aggregate TFP. Notice also that the higher A, the higher
the growth in relative capital per worker. This is a composition e￿ect: when A is large, the
36share of z in aggregate capital is higher at steady state. Since, in E, z grows while k decreases,
it implies that the share of growing investment is high, which results in a higher growth in
aggregate investment. I’s indebtment level is increasing in A. This is because, when A is high,
the steady-state level of capital is high, which implies that, to be consistent with the observed
initial share of E in world’s capital, the inferred initial level of aggregate capital in E is large,
including k. Therefore, when ￿nancial markets integrate, the adjustment in E’s external position
is large. The same holds for average current account de￿cits. As a consequence, the results which
are closer to the data, as far as the external position is concerned, are obtained with A = 1.7.
In the calibration with ￿xed external position in I, summed up in column (d) of Table 2, the
better ￿t in terms of capital ￿ows is compensated by a worse ￿t in terms of growth as compared
to column (a). The average current account de￿cit in I corresponds quite well to the data,
but growth in relative TFP is underestimated. This is intuitive: the external debt of I is an
indirect measure of the initial misallocation in E, because it gives the amount of the adjutment
in short-term capital in E after ￿nancial integration. In column (d), the external debt of I is
smaller than in (a), which implies that the initial misallocation in E is not as strong, so the
aggregate gains in TFP due to a better allocation of capital are smaller. A corollary of this
limited misallocation is that the fall in short-term capital is mitigated, which leads to a higher
aggregate growth in investment. As a result, the share of growth due to TFP is even lower.
Still, as before, the introduction of capital installation costs could make these results closer to
the data. Besides, our interpretation of the origins of TFP growth is not exclusive of others, for
example knowledge transfers from North to South. Put di￿erently, calibrating the model in order
to match the external position of U gives an amount of TFP growth due to capital reallocation
smaller than in the data, which is compatible with other sources of TFP growth.
5.4 Adding capital installation costs
In this section, the model is enriched with capital installation costs in order to make the model
￿t better the data. In particular, I check whether: (i) the initial fall in investment in E is limited,
making the dynamics of relative aggregate capital stocks and productions look more like in the
data; (ii) the external position and current account adjustments in I are quantitatively closer to
the data when matching the parameters to account for the observed TFP growth.
De￿ne ik as the investment in short-term capital and iz as the investment in long-term capital.
The entrepreneur’s program is modi￿ed by the introduction of capital installation costs. It can























   
   
f(kt+1) + Rt+1bt+1  ϕ
ik
t = kt+1   (1   δ)kt
iz
t = zt+1   (1   δ)zt






Equation (13) implies that any change in the stock of capital is costly, whether it has to be
increased or decreased. It also implies that installation costs are zero when the ￿rm’s investment
is at its steady state level δ. Besides, this speci￿cation entails that it is not only costly to change
the stock of aggregate capital, but also to transfer capital from one technology to the other. ψ
is the key parameter of the installation costs. It represents their size.





z∞/x∞ changes slightly in order to ￿t the observed increase in TFP in E. For this
purpose, it is set to 37%. The baseline calibration for ψ, the installation cost parameter, is set
to 1. This speci￿cation is chosen to match the estimates of Gilchrist and Sim (2007) and Eberly
et al. (2008) on ￿rm-level data9. Gilchrist and Sim (2007) ￿nd estimates of ψ which are robustly
close to 1. The estimates of Eberly et al. (2008) range between 0.8 and 1.8. For the sensitivity
analysis, I also set ψ to 0.5, 2 and 5. The results are reported in Figure 6 and Table 3.
Graph (c) in Figure 6 presents both the interest rate and the cost of capital. The initial
fall in the interest rate in I increases the incentives to invest for domestic agents. However, the
fall in the cost of capital is limited by the increase in the installation cost. The cost of capital
therefore stays temporarily above the interest rate. In E, because of the initial increase in the
interest rate, the agents want to hold more short-term capital. However, the installation costs
incurred by the diminution in the stock of short-term capital decrease the incentives to diminish
the stock of capital. The cost of short-term capital therefore stays temporarily below the interest
rate. Consequently, as graphs (a) and (b) show, the introduction of installation costs makes the
9Gilchrist and Sim (2007) used Korean data and Eberly et al. (2008) relied on US data.
38Figure 6: E￿ect of ￿nancial integration at t = 0 - Capital installation costs
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which is set to 37%.
adjustment in the capital stocks smoother. In particular, the stock of short-term capital does
not fall sharply in E when ￿nancial markets integrate. Similarly, the initial adjustment in the
capital stocks in I is delayed. As a consequence, the relative stock of aggregate capital is almost
￿at at the date of ￿nancial integration and the relative production per capita increases from the
beginning to the end of the period (graph (f)).
Noticeably, graph (b) of Figure 6 shows that, as bonds are substituted to short-term capital
in E’s liquid portfolio, E’s external position increases progressively. The progressive increase in
E’s assets is matched by the progressive increase in I’s debt. The adjustment in the current
account of I is therefore smoother than in the baseline case.
39Table 3: Calibration results - Capital installation costs
Baseline Sensitivity Data
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)





z∞/(k∞+z∞) 37% 37% 36% 35% Unobservable
ψ 1 0.5 2 5 Unobservable
TFP growth of E relative
to I 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Growth of capital per
worker in E relative to I 37% 40% 33% 26% 21%
Growth of production per
worker in E relative to I 25% 26% 24% 21% 18%
% of relative growth due
to TFP 50% 49% 53% 57% 68%
End-of-period bI/yI -60% -61% -57% -49% -22%
Average ∆bI/yI -4,7% -4,8% -4,5% -3.9% -2,6%
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and Penn World Tables
6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).
I corresponds to U: United States, Australia, United Kingdom.
E corresponds to EM: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand
and Venezuela.
Period: 1990-2003.
Capital stocks in EM and U are estimated with the perpetual inventory method, using the procedure of Caselli
(2004). TFP values in EM and U are estimated as y
i/(x
i)
, i 2 fEM,Ug, where α = 0.36, y
i and x
i are
respectively output per worker and capital per worker in i.
As for the quantitative results shown in Table 3, the end-of-period indebtment of I is only
slightly decreased. Only for very high, unrealistic adjustment costs is the external position
signi￿cantly a￿ected. The results of column (d), drawn with the extreme hypothesis that ψ = 5,
give a level of debt which is still twice as high as in the data. These disappointing results are
40due to the fact that the installation costs are e￿ective only during the transition. As the level of
capital converges to its steady state, the installation costs disappear. This is illustrated by the
fact that the cost of capital in graph (c) of Figure 6 converges towards the interest rate. At the
end of the period, given our time span, this convergence is close to be achieved. Consistently,
the other quantities are also una￿ected for realistic levels of installation costs.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the presence of ￿nancing constraints on the more productive tech-
nology in emerging markets can account, at least qualitatively, both for their capital out￿ows
(Fact 1) and for their relative growth since 1990 as compared to the industrial countries, in par-
ticular the US (Fact 2). This growth is due both to the convergence of the level of capital to its
steady state (Fact 3), but also to TFP growth (Fact 4). The latter is due to a better allocation
of capital enabled by the replacement of the less productive, short-term capital with external
bonds in the portfolio of the emerging countries. Indeed, since the developed world has better
￿nancial markets, its demand for liquid assets for hoarding purposes is lower than that of the
developing countries; as a result, when ￿nancial globalization occurs, the emerging economies
hold US bonds in order to use it as a hoard.
Qualitatively, in particular when accounting for capital installation costs, the model ￿ts rather
well the observed trends in the US current account, relative TFP growth and capital accumulation
in emerging countries (hence their relative labor productivity growth). Quantitatively, when the
model is ￿tted on the observed relative TFP growth, the level of debt and current account de￿cits
in the US is over-estimated as well as the share of growth due to capital accumulation. However,
the order of magnitude is partly captured. Besides, when the model is ￿tted on the US external
position, the implied TFP growth due to capital reallocation is smaller than in the data, which
is compatible with other sources of TFP growth.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, I examine how k, z and b vary with R under PFM and IFM. Then I show how the interest
rate adjusts after the ￿nancial integration of I and E. Finally, depending on how the interest




f′′(f′−1(R)) < 0 and ∂z∗/∂R = 1
g′′(g′−1(R)) < 0: k∗ and z∗ are decreasing in R because
of decreasing marginal returns. As a consequence, since b∗(R) = w   k∗(R)   z∗(R), b∗ is
increasing in R.
Under IFM:
First, assume that the constrained allocation is chosen.
Because even for the constrained allocation the entrepreneur chooses ¯ k optimally, ¯ k is de-
creasing in R because it becomes relatively less e￿cient than ¯ b: ∂¯ k/∂R = 1
f′′(f′−1(R)) < 0.
Di￿erentiating (FC) with respect to R, and using the optimality condition f′(¯ k) = R, we
obtain ∂¯ b/∂R =  ∂¯ k/∂R  
 b
R, which is positive when b small, since ∂¯ k/∂R < 0.
Di￿erentiating (BC) with respect to R, we ￿nd ∂¯ z/∂R =  ∂¯ k/∂R   ∂¯ b/∂R. Replacing
∂¯ b/∂R, this yields: ∂¯ z/∂R =
 b
R.
We have ¯ b( ¯ Ra) = 0, so when R = ¯ Ra, we have ∂¯ b/∂R =  ∂¯ k/∂R > 0. Therefore, in the
neighborhood of ¯ Ra, if R < ¯ Ra, then ¯ b < 0, so ∂¯ b/∂R > 0. ¯ b is therefore always negative when
R < ¯ Ra, and we have ∂¯ b/∂R > 0 and ∂¯ z/∂R > 0. However, when R > ¯ Ra, ∂¯ b/∂R has an
ambiguous sign. Still, for R > ¯ Ra, it can be shown that ¯ b > 0 and as a consequence ∂¯ z/∂R > 0.
Indeed, it can be seen that, when b is high, b can decrease with R but it never becomes negative:
if b falls a lot, then ∂¯ k/∂R will eventually become predominant, and b would start to rise again.
Adjustment of R after ￿nancial integration:
For R < ¯ Ra, both b∗ and ¯ b are negative. For R > Ra∗, both b∗ and ¯ b are positive. For
¯ Ra  R  Ra∗, b∗  0 and ¯ b  0, so, if there exists a solution Ro such that b∗(Ro) =  ¯ b(Ro),
it is necessary in the [ ¯ Ra,Ra∗] interval. Such a solution exists by continuity of b∗ and ¯ b since
¯ b( ¯ Ra) = 0, ¯ b(Ra∗)  0, b∗( ¯ Ra) < 0 and b∗(Ra∗) = 0.
Now, we can show that for R = Ro, the credit constraint is still binding in the emerging
economy by ruling out the ￿rst-best allocation and the risky one. First, a su￿cient condition for
ruling out the ￿rst-best allocation is z∗(Ro)  ¯ z(Ro). This condition is equivalent to w   f(k 
(Ro))   b∗(Ro)  w   f(¯ k(Ro))  ¯ b(Ro), which corresponds to b∗(Ro)  ¯ b(Ro). We have shown
that b∗(R)  0 and ¯ b(R)  0 for all R 2 [ ¯ Ra,Ra∗], and since Ro 2 [ ¯ Ra,Ra∗], we have necessarily
b∗(Ro)  ¯ b(Ro). Therefore, the ￿rst-best allocation is not implementable for R = Ro. Similarly,
Assumption 3.1 implies that ¯ z( ¯ Ra) > z∗∗( ¯ Ra). Besides, we have shown that for R > ¯ Ra,
∂¯ z/∂R > 0. On the other hand, ∂z∗∗/∂R < 0. Therefore, ¯ z(Ro) > z∗∗(Ro), which implies that
45the allocation for R = Ro is the constrained one.
As a conclusion, a solution with a binding ￿nancing constraint in the emerging markets exists
and is characterized by an interest rate Ro in the [ ¯ Ra,Ra∗] interval.
Adjustment of the portfolio after ￿nancial integration:
Consider the general equilibrium solution characterized by R = Ro.
Since the industrial economy experiences a drop in the interest rate when ￿nancial markets
integrate, k∗ and z∗ rise and b∗ decreases.
Since the emerging economy experiences a drop in the interest rate when ￿nancial markets
integrate, ¯ k falls while ¯ z and ¯ b rise. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We consider the solution satisfying Assumption 3.1 highlighted in Proposition 3.2, with a binding


















Then the derivatives can be inferred:
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Which is true if A or Φ high, or if w small.
If the above condition is satis￿ed, that is if A and ϕE high, if w small, then ∂¯ y/∂R > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1
The (8) and (9) system that characterizes the dynamics of the industrial country is linearized






κ + (1   β)
nE
nI [ϕ   f(k∞)]g′′(z∞)
]
∆zI






t   (χ + β2g′′(z∞)
nE
nI [ϕ   f(k∞)])∆zI
t+1 for t > 0 (15)











nI [ϕ   f(k∞)] (16)





β   [1   δ(1   α)]
)(
1
β   [1   δ]
)
and χ = 1 + 2A
−1
1− > 1.
Equations (14), (15) and (16), which govern the dynamics of the industrial economy, are
independent from the rest of the system, since they only involve zI and CI. Once the dynamics
of zI is solved using this independent dynamic sub-system with 2 variables and 2 equations, the
dynamics of zE can be inferred using Equations (10) and (11).
We replace ∆CI
t+1 and ∆CI
t in (14) using (15). We obtain the following second-order di￿er-











κ + (1   β)nE
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κ + (1   β)nE
nI [ϕ   f(k∞)]g′′(z∞)
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χ + β2g′′(z∞)nE






nI [ϕ   f(k∞)])
= 0
Under the condition χ >  β2g′′(z∞)nE
nI [ϕ   f(k∞)], the above second-order polynomial has
two positive roots, one above one and denoted λ′
I, and the other below one and denoted λI. The
former is irrelevant because it leads to a path for ∆zI
t that is explosive. Then we know that, for










as an initial condition, derived from Equation (16). At impact, zI thus
increases in the industrial country and then slowly decreases towards its steady state.
If the emerging country is credit constrained all along the transition path, then the industrial
country’s dynamics is well described by the previous equations. If ϕ   f(k∞) is small, then
47χ >  β2g′′(z∞)nE
nI [ϕ   f(k∞)]. Therefore, as said before, ∆zI admits a unique trajectory
towards the steady state.
Since ϕ > f(k∞) and λ′






> 0. This yields the dynamics for zI when






t = 1/β(1 + A
−1
1−)∆zI
t and ∆Rt = g′′(z∞)∆zI
t . 
Proof of Proposition 5.2
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t in Equation (17) using (18), we ￿nd that ∆zE
t is de￿ned implicitly





















=  β2g′′(z∞)[ϕ   f(k∞)](1   λI)∆zI
t+1 (19)
The characteristic polynomial of the homogeneous equation is

















This polynomial has two positive roots, λ′
E > 1, and λE, which is positive and lower than one.
The only relevant root is therefore λE. A particular solution to the general equation is of the
form: ∆zE
t = v∆zI





















=  β2(1   λI)g′′(z∞)[ϕ   f(k∞)]




The general, converging solution for ∆zE





t+1. Here, ∆z0 is given so ∆z′
0 must satisfy ∆zE
0 = ∆z′
0 + v∆zI








48To study the evolution of zE, we have to determine the sign of v, which is the same as λE λI.
Consider the case where ϕE = f(k∞): PI(λ)   PE(λ) = βκ(1   1/χ)λ. We have χ > 1, so, for
λ > 0, PI(λ) > PE(λ). As a result, PI(λE) > PE(λE) = 0. Since PI is decreasing on the [0,1]
interval, and PI(λI) = 0, then λI > λE. This is still the case by continuity when ϕE close to
f(k∞). Therefore, v < 0.
As a consequence, since ∆zI
1 is of the same sign as ϕE  f(k∞), which is positive, the second
term of the RHS is negative. Since, additionally, ∆zE
0 < 0 and ∆zI
1 and v are proportional to
jϕE   f(k∞)j, which is small compared to j∆zE
0 j, the second term is also negative. Therefore,
∆zE
t is always negative and zE is increasing in t.
Existence of the constrained solution: We now show that the solution de￿ned by Equa-
tion (20) under the hypothesis of forever binding ￿nancing constraints does exist. We have to
prove ￿rst that if zE
t follows (20), then the entrepreneurs are indeed constrained. It is the case as
long as ∆zI
t > ∆zE
t . ϕE > f(k∞) implies that ∆zI
t > 0. It has been shown also that ∆zE
t < 0.
As a consequence, ∆zI
t > ∆zE
t for all t > 0.
Second, we have to prove that under Assumption 4.1, the risky allocation is not a better
choice along the transition path with binding ￿nancing constraint. First, recall that Assumption
4.1, the risky z is below the constrained one for the interest rate corresponding to the constrained
allocation. When the constraint is binding on the convergence path, zE increases. Besides, the
interest rate increases, so the corresponding risky allocation decreases. The constrained allocation
is still above the risky one, so the latter is ruled out along the constrained transition path.
Evolution of bE
t : When the economy is constrained, ∆bE










When ϕE   f(k∞) is small, the substitution e￿ect dominates so ∆bE
t is of the opposite sign of
∆zI
t , which is positive: bE
t is below its steady state and is increasing in t.
Evolution of kE
t : After the integration of ￿nancial markets, kE
t follows the same path as
kI
t, since f′(kE
t ) is equal to the world interest rate.
Evolution of yE






























v is proportional to ϕE   f(k∞). Therefore, if ϕE is close to f(k∞), then the second term is
positive. On the opposite, as we have already shown, the ￿rst term is negative. However, ∆zI
1
is proportional to ϕE   f(k∞), so when ϕE   f(k∞) is small as compared to j∆zE
0 j, the RHS is
49negative and increasing in t for small values of t. However, since λI > λE, as we have shown, the




t: Up to a linear approximation, yE
t /yI
t evolves in the same direction as
∆yE
t   ∆yI




















All the terms of the RHS are negative and increasing in t, so ∆yE
t   ∆yI
t is increasing in t. 
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